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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, : 
a municipal corporation, : 
: Brief of the Respondent 
Plaintiff and Respondent, : Murray City Corporation 
vs. : 
Case No. 89-611-CA 
THOMAS L. HUBER, t 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals in this matter 
is found in Section 78-2a-3 (2) (d) , Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended) . Pursuant to Rule 3, Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, an appeal of the final order and judgment of the 
Circuit Court: L. H. Griffiths, Judge, Murray Department, in 
the matter has been properly filed within the time required by 
Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. Final order 
having been entered by the court below and no further claims 
remaining to be determined, appeal was taken by Defendant-
Appellant to this Court. 
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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This appeal is from the entry of three conditional nolo 
contendere pleas entered by Defendant-Appellant Huber in the 
court below which pleas were conditioned upon his reserved 
right to appeal the decision denying his pretrial motion to 
suppress. Huber was charged with three counts pursuant to the 
authority of Murray City as codified in the Code of Murray 
City: Driving under the influence, Carrying an open container 
in a vehicle, and Escape from official custody. Pursuant to 
Huber's motion to suppress, the case came on for hearing May 
23, 1989, before the Honorable L. H. Griffiths. At the 
conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court denied the 
motion to suppress, found that the motion to dismiss was not 
based upon any other issue and, further, declined to rule on 
the motion to suppress the intoxilyzer result until such time 
as evidence is presented for its admissibility. The case came 
on for a non-jury trial before the Honorable L. H. Griffiths, 
presiding in the Third Circuit Court, Murray Department, 
September 15, 1989. At that time, Defense Counsel Mr. Long 
made a motion to enter the conditional nolo contendere pleas; 
Plaintiff's counsel Ms. Hendrickson joined in the motion 
conditioned upon the court's approval of the conditional 
pleas. The court below accepted the conditional nolo 
contendere pleas as well as plaintiff's motion that a written 
statement of facts be submitted to the record prior to the 
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court entering sentence on October 18, 1989. On October 16, 
1989, a written statement of facts supported by the record made 
at the suppression hearing dated May 23, 1989, was filed with 
the court. On October 2, 1989, notice of appeal was dated and 
mailed by defendant's counsel to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Notice from the Court of Appeals advised parties that the 
appeal had been filed with the Court of Appeals on October 12f 
1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the initial stop pursuant to the observed 
traffic violation of running a red light was constitutionally 
valid and consequentially whether the subsequent investigation 
of the possibility of Huber driving while under the influence 
of alcohol was justified by reasonable suspicion. 
2. Whether the trial court's denial of Huber's pretrial 
motion to suppress alleging an improper stop was supported by 
credible witness testimony and thus was not clearly erroneous. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent, Murray City Corporation, has codified in its 
ordinances certain acts which subject violators to prosecution, 
among those proscribed acts are failure to observe traffic 
control devices. On or about March 17, 1989, Officer Mark 
Lindgren was on duty within the jurisdictional boundaries of 
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Murray City. During his shift, he observed Appellant Huber at 
a light-controlled intersection execute a left turn against a 
red light. Officer Lindgren initiated a stop of the vehicle 
driven by Appellant Huber to issue a citation for the traffic 
violation. Upon approaching the vehicle and the driver, 
Officer Lindgren subsequently conducted an investigatory stop 
incident to the lawful traffic violation stop. The basis for 
the further investigation was the obvious odor of alcohol 
immediately perceivable by the officer; additional facts were 
gathered during a brief investigatory inquiry. The officer was 
not obliged to ignore the facts presented to him and thus the 
ultimate decision to arrest was made. Subsequent events lead 
to additional charges being brought against Huber. In a search 
of the vehicle incident to arrest and in accord with the police 
department's vehicle inventory policies, an open container of 
an alcoholic beverage was found in the passenger compartment. 
Upon being taken into custody at the Murray City Police 
Department, Huber escaped from custody prior to official 
release. These offenses were also pled to by Huber as part of 
the conditional plea arrangement entered and accepted by the 
trial court on September 15, 1989, absent any evidence being 
presented. 
Upon the case being set for hearing before the trial 
judge, Huber, through counsel, filed a motion to suppress based 
upon the initial stop and therefore evidence subsequently 
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obtained. That suppression hearing was conducted May 23, 1989; 
at the conclusion of the hearing the trial judge denied the 
motion to suppress based upon the stop and declined to rule on 
the substantive evidence of the offenses charged until such 
time as testimony was presented at trial. Finding that defense 
counsel anchored his motion to suppress and dismiss upon the 
theory—not contradicted by defense counsel upon inquiry into 
that position—that the stop was merely pretextual, the trial 
court ruled that a pretrial date of June 6, 1989, would be the 
next hearing of the matter. [T-441 . On June 6 th 
defense counsel was present but without defendant; on June 
13th, the next hearing date set, defendant Huber was present 
but without defense counsel. Upon this series of events, the 
trial court set September 15, 1989, as the date for a trial by 
jury. 
It was at this juncture that defense counsel Mr. Long 
proposed that the case proceed by entry of conditional nolo 
contendere pleas. The condition behind the pleas was the 
preservation of Huber's challenge of the denial of the pretrial 
suppression motion. Thus, on September 15, 1989, the trial 
[References to the transcript of the formal hearing on 
defendant's pretrial motion to suppress held before the 
Honorable L. H. Griffiths, Judge, Third Circuit Court, Murray 
Department, shall be designated by the initial MT".l 
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cotirt entertained this motion and did accept the conditional 
pleas. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial court 
accepted Plaintiff Murray City's motion that a written 
statement of facts be filed with the court prior to sentencing, 
set for October 18, 1989. In accordance with the court's 
request, such fact statement was filed with the Third Circuit 
Court, Murray Department, and mailed to defense counsel Mr. 
Long, October 16, 1989. This fact statement has been made part 
of the record in this case. 
STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS 
On or about March 17, 1989, Officer Mark Lindgren, 
2 
Murray City Police Department, was on duty [R-43] . His 
primary duties at that time entailed enforcement of 
alcohol-related ordinances adopted by Murray City in accordance 
with the authority vested in municipalities. Shortly before 
midnight, Officer Lindgren's attention was drawn to a blue 
Chevrolet whose driver was "revving" the engine. Both vehicles 
were stopped facing northbound at a light-controlled 
intersection at Vine and State Streets. [T-4, 5; R-43]. The 
driver of the blue Chevrolet was in the left-turn only lane 
[References to portions of the record before the Utah 
Court of Appeals shall be designated by the letter "R".] 
-9-
which is controlled by a separate green arrow signal; the 
officer was stopped in a northbound lane to the right of the 
Chevrolet. [T-ll, 12; R-43]. The light sequence for 
left-turns only began but the Chevrolet did not turn; when the 
left-turn green arrow turned to a circular red signal, the 
Chevrolet did make the left turn. Officer Lindgren pursued the 
Chevrolet and initiated a stop of that vehicle at approximately 
35 East Vine Street. [T-5, 6; R-43]. Officer Lindgren 
approached the driver, still seated in the vehicle, to inform 
him of the reason for the stop. During testimony given at the 
suppression hearing, Officer Lindgren stated that "as blatant 
as that [running the red light] was, I always will pull over a 
car." [T-6]. 
Upon approaching the vehicle and making contact with the 
driver, Officer Lindgren testified that he noticed an odor of 
alcohol emanating from the general area where the driver was 
seated. [T-7, 17; R-43]. Noticing the odor, Officer 
Lindgrenfs training and experience prompted his inquiry of the 
driver as to whether the driver had been drinking. The driver 
answered affirmatively. [T-9, 18; R-44]. Upon request, the 
driver provided a driver's license with the name Thomas L. 
Huber, date of birth 01-04-67, and with a photograph which 
matched the driver's physical appearance. [R-44]. Following 
up upon the factors now before him, the officer requested that 
the driver perform some field sobriety tests; the driver 
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voluntarily complied with this request. Officer Lindgren 
testified at the hearing below that he followed normal 
procedure in requesting field sobriety tests• This includes an 
oral description of the test and a demonstration by the 
officer. While observing the suspect's performance, the 
officer will make notes which will become part of the incident 
report filed by the officer. These notes include "errors11 in 
performance of the tests by the suspect in comparison with the 
standard procedures. On this occasion, Officer Lindgren 
determined upon his observation of the suspect that the odor of 
alcohol and admission of drinking by the suspect and impaired 
performance of the field sobriety tests that he had obtained 
sufficient evidence to support a probable cause that the 
offense of driving under the influence had been committed by 
this suspect; the decision to arrest was made. Officer 
Lindgren informed Huber that he was under arrest. [T-9, 22-26, 
27; R-44, 45]. 
Officer Lindgren testified at the hearing below that 
upon informing Defendant Huber he was under arrest, Officer 
Lindgren placed handcuffs on the Defendant, looked in 
Defendant's mouth, conducted a brief search of the person and 
then transported Defendant to the police station. [T-28; 
R-45] . At the police station, Officer Lindgren requested 
Defendant Huber to submit to a breath test; Defendant Huber 
responded affirmatively. The test was conducted in strict 
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compliance with standard procedures and no difficulties with 
the equipment or the subject (Defendant Huber) were observed by 
the officer. After observing the time limit mandated in State 
v. Baker, 355 P.2d 806, 56 Wash.2d 846 (Wash. I960), the 
breath-alcohol test was conducted by Officer Lindgren. The 
intoxilyzer machine was properly calibrated, the operational 
checklist was followed and a legible test result card was 
produced. The breath-alcohol concentration result printed was 
.168; Officer Lindgren testified under cross-examination to a 
result of .16. [T-28, 29; R-45, 46]. At the hearing below, 
the trial judge, operating from the understanding of 
Defendant's motion to suppress that the primary issue was the 
basis of the stop, and inquiring as to that understanding, 
[T-291 and after hearing defense counsel's argument [T-33, 
34-39] the trial judge denied the motion to suppress, finding 
that the officer had sufficient reason to stop Defendant 
Huber's vehicle for violating the red light and, further, had 
reasonable suspicion to support the subsequent investigation 
into the probability that Huber was driving while under the 
influence of alcohol. [T-41, 42-44]. 
At the suppression hearing below, the only facts taken 
were those satisfying the trial court's consideration as to the 
propriety of the initial stop and subsequent arrest of Huber. 
This left the remaining facts of the charge of driving while 
under the influence of alcohol, as well as the facts supporting 
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the charges of carrying an open container in a vehicle and 
escape from official custody to be adduced at trial. Trial was 
set for September 15, 1989. On that date, the trial court did 
accept Defendant Huber's entry of conditional no contest pleas 
to all three charges. The court also accepted Plaintiff Murray 
City's motion for filing a written statement of facts in 
support of each element of each count filed against Defendant 
Huber. [R-42 through 49]. 
On October 4, 1989, Defendant's notice of appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals was filed. Notice from the Court of 
Appeals advised parties that the appeal had been filed with the 
Court of Appeals on October 12, 1989. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
An officer may stop anyone seen violating a traffic 
ordinance and issue a citation; this is standard operating 
procedure for any police department. When that same officer is 
confronted with evidence which can be perceived without 
conducting a search, and that evidence reasonably would be 
acted upon by an objective officer in similar circumstances, 
that officer is not obliged to ignore incriminating evidence. 
The protection afforded by the Constitution, whether 
considering the United States or Utah Constitution, governing 
police activity where search and seizure are concerned can be 
summarized as follows: The right of the people to be protected 
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from unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. 
Whether or not a particular search and seizure incident is 
reasonable turns upon an evaluation of the facts available to 
the officer at the inception of his action in conjunction with 
rational inferences drawn therefrom which would reasonably 
justify the governmental intrusion. In the first instance, the 
driver and vehicle were stopped by an officer witnessing a 
blatant traffic violation, that of running a red light. In the 
second instance, the officer was entitled to conduct a brief 
investigatory inquiry of the driver so long as he had a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the facts and rational 
inferences drawn from those facts would lead a reasonable, 
objective person to conclude that a crime had been or was about 
to be committed. When Officer Lindgren smelled a moderate to 
strong odor of alcohol emanating from the driver's general 
environs, ascertained by brief inquiry of the driver that 
indeed alcohol had been consumed, and personally witnessed a 
blatant moving traffic violation, training and experience 
entitled him to assess the situation in light of his particular 
experience. In either instance, the test for reasonableness 
turns on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances. 
Officer Lindgren contained the scope of his brief investigatory 
inquiry to the issue of whether the driver exhibited observable 
signs of impairment which could be inferred logically from the 
ingestion of alcohol. Upon satisfying himself that the driver 
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was impaired to a degree considered unsafer probable cause then 
existed to formally arrest the driver. 
In summary, sufficient facts adduced at the suppression 
hearing below satisfied the trial judge that reasonable 
suspicion justified the traffic stop and detention and probable 
cause existed to warrant that the case proceed to trial on the 
facts. The trial judge hearing and assessing uncontroverted 
testimony by Officer Lindgren deemed that evidence credible. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL STOP OF HUBER'S VEHICLE WAS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY JUSTIFIED AS INCIDENT TO A 
LAWFUL STOP FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION AND 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION WAS JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS 
OF SPECIFIC, ARTICULABLE FACTS TOGETHER WITH 
LOGICAL INFERENCES LEADING A REASONABLE PERSON 
TO CONCLUDE THAT HUBER HAD COMMITTED OR WAS 
ABOUT TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF DRIVING WHILE 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. 
Uncontroverted testimony at the suppression hearing 
established that Officer Lindgren had clear view of a moving 
traffic violation, viz. running a red light. Under concerted 
cross- examination, Officer Lindgren did not waver from his 
recollection of the incident. Huber had made his left-turn 
maneuver after the directional arrow light had turned to a 
steady red circular signal; he had not been in the intersection 
prior to the light change thereby making the completion of the 
turn legal. In general, Appellant Huber contends that the stop 
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was based on "hunch" and was, therefore, pretextual; in 
specificity, Appellant contends alternatively that while the 
turn was made against a red light it was justified because he 
was having mechanical difficulties with his vehicle and 
furthermore the traffic flow was light and he did not interfere 
with any other traffic on the road. [T-13, 14-15] . To give 
this line of reasoning any credence is to do irreparable damage 
to our present code of traffic regulation. All drivers of 
vehicles on the highways are depending upon all other drivers 
of vehicles to observe the rules of the road. Each of us, 
wending our way along to our destination, travels with a great 
deal of trust in this conformity. 
One must not lose sight of the uncontroverted fact 
adduced at the hearing below that Officer Lindgren stopped 
Huber after observing a violation of Murray City's Traffic Code 
Section 18-45. Section 18-45, Murray City Code, provides in 
pertinent part that 
No driver of a vehicle shall disobey the 
instruction of any traffic-control device 
placed in accordance with the provisions of 
this chapter. . . . 
The general police enforcement authorizing provision of the 
Murray City Code found at Section 18-37 provides that 
It shall be the duty of the police 
department to enforce the traffic 
regulations of this city and all of the 
state vehicle laws applicable to street 
traffic in this city, to make arrests for 
traffic violations, to investigate 
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accidents, to develop ways and means to 
improve traffic conditions and to carry out 
those duties specifically imposed by the 
ordinances of this city. 
Thus, it follows that the officer authorized to arrest or issue 
misdemeanor citations must necessarily be authorized to stop 
the person in the first place. If the officer may stop a 
vehicle observed violating the traffic code, he may also 
approach the driver and pose certain questions sufficient to 
prepare a citation. It is at this point that a variety of 
circumstances could occur. Without more, a citation would be 
written and the driver would be on his or her way. In the 
instant case, Officer Lindgren was presented with additional 
evidence, namely an odor of alcohol emanating from the person 
in actual control of a vehicle. This evidence could be likened 
to evidence found in plain view. This court has considered the 
requirements of a proper seizure of evidence found in plain 
view. In State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah App. 
1989) , the three-prong test was succinctly stated? however, in 
that particular case the evidence seized was not "clearly 
incriminating." In the instant case, Officer Lindgren was (1) 
standing in a place he was lawfully entitled to be, (2) the 
odor was noticeable enough as he stood outside the vehicle to 
raise justifiable suspicions, and (3) the evidence was clearly 
incriminating in that a person under the influence of alcohol 
may not be in actual physical control of a vehicle. The 
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officer was under a duty to investigate the reasonable 
suspicion that this particular driver was violating the 
prohibition against driving while under the influence of 
alcohol whether determined as unsafely impaired or over the 
legal limit of alcohol concentration established by the 
lawmakers of this state and community. Surely the officer 
standing beside a vehicle just stopped for running through a 
red light is in a place he is entitled to be. From that place 
any evidence in plain view may be seized. 
In 198 3 the Utah Supreme Court decided a case very 
similar to the present case. In State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 
(Utah 1983), the Utah Court affirmed the convictions below 
finding that the police officers stopping defendant Cole's 
vehicle did so based upon a justifiable traffic stop. The 
court specifically found that the stop was not a pretext to 
search for evidence of a crime. (Ld. at 122-123). Noting 
that stopping and detaining a vehicle and its occupants 
constitutes a seizure governed by the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States as applied to the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court went on to state that the 
prohibition is against unreasonable seizures or searches 
(Id. at 123). 
The case before this court began as a traffic violation 
stop. This officer, too, was entitled to approach the driver 
and obtain information necessary for the citation. Evidence of 
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a crime plainly evident may be seized without a warrant. As 
the Cole court noted, the officer is not required to ignore 
such evidence. {!<&. at 123) . A similar case was decided by 
the Oregon Court of Appeals. In State v. Watson, 602 P. 2d 
1098, 43 Or.App. 309 (Or. App. 1979) , Defendant Watson was 
stopped by police officers because the license plate was bent 
under obscuring the validation sticker. Upon approaching the 
vehicle, the officers standing outside the vehicle could 
plainly see a marijuana cigarette and two roach clips. The 
defendant consented to a search of the car and his person. 
This search turned up a pistol in defendant's coat pocket. 
Both the marijuana and the pistol were found admissible 
evidence pursuant to a lawful stop, search and seizure. The 
appeals court reversed the prior suppression finding it clearly 
erroneous. (Watson, 602 P.2d at 1099). 
Respondent Murray City contends that the traffic 
violation justified the stop of Huber's vehicle. A review of 
cases considering this issue supports this position. A fairly 
lengthy assessment is found in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 
972, 977-980 (Utah App. 1988). The fact that a person is not 
shorn of his or her constitutional right to be free from 
unreasonable searches or seizures simply by entering a vehicle 
is fairly settled. The court in Sierra affirms this 
conclusion, favorable citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). 
-1Q-
Additionally, random stops of vehicles have repeatedly been 
found violative of constitutional standards. Prouse, 440 
U.S. at 665-661, 99 S.Ct. at 1396-1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); 
see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883, 
95 S.Ct. 2574, 2581, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Sierra, 754 P.2d 
at 977. 
The undisputed facts adduced in the hearing below 
clearly set out a traffic violation observed by the arresting 
officer. This being the case, the issue before this court is 
not a random stop of a vehicle with the attendant 
constitutional violations that action provokes. It is 
instructional at this point of the argument to again refer to 
the court's discussion in Sierra regarding stops for traffic 
violations. No one's interest is ultimately served by 
accomplishing enforcement of law by subterfuge. The dangers of 
this approach are eloquently presented in Taglavore v. United 
States, 291 F.2d 262, 266-267 (9th Cir. 1961). Appellant 
Huber argued at the suppression hearing below and argues here 
on appeal that the stop of his vehicle for the traffic 
violation was mere pretext to conduct a fishing expedition. 
"TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" 
On previous occasions this court has visited the issue 
of traffic stops which are transformed into arrests for 
subsequently discovered evidence of criminal activity. Certain 
constitutional protections may be activated depending upon the 
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circumstances. As numerous cases note, the factual 
circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter 
determine the validity of police action which is characterized 
as detention or arrest. Whether the specific issue under 
consideration is a traffic stop, a pretext stop, or what 
constitutes the standard of "reasonable suspicion," courts 
uniformly resort to an assessment of the totality of the 
circumstances. (Sierra, 754 P.2d at 975-979, wherein this 
court cites to numerous cases and jurisdictions regarding this 
topic; citations omitted.) 
The court in United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 
230 (5th Cir. 1984) , succinctly framed the three separate 
levels of police-citizen encounters which had been discussed a 
year before by the Supreme Court in Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 497-499, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1323-1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 
(19 83). These encounters called the Fourth Amendment 
protections against unreasonable search and seizure into play. 
Officer Lindgren's stop of Huber falls into a category beyond a 
simple approach to a citizen to pose questions just as anyone 
may approach another person and make an inquiry. The status of 
Officer Lindgren's encounter with Huber would be defined by the 
Merritt court as that level of encounter wherein an officer 
stops and detains a person based upon an articulable suspicion 
of criminal activity having been or about to be committed. 
Whether considering Officer Lindgren's observation of the 
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traffic violation or his smelling a noticeable odor of alcohol 
emanating from the driver, he had a justifiable, articulable 
reason to have detained Huber. Once having made a valid stopf 
the officer is entitled to satisfy his reasonable suspicions* 
This type of encounter must respect the citizen's right to be 
free from unreasonable search or seizure. 
Having validly stopped Huber for his red light violation 
and being presented with evidence of a noticeable odor of 
alcohol coming from the driver of a vehicle, was Officer 
Lindgren doing anything but what a reasonable officer would do 
under similar circumstances. Keeping in mind that Officer 
Lindgren validly stopped the vehicle for a traffic offense 
committed in his presence [T-5, 6; R-431 , and keeping in mind 
the suppression hearing dealt with the validity of the initial 
stop [T-29], assessing the circumstances further as though this 
were a stop based upon reasonable suspicion alone becomes 
somewhat theoretical. The entire case was not presented at the 
hearing below; additional facts to be adduced at trial would 
establish that indeed this officer continued to act reasonably 
within the scope of intrusion precipitated by Huber's action 
occasioning Officer Lindgren's initial stop. This being the 
case, resort to the Sierra court's analysis of authorities 
grappling with the standard for reasonable suspicion is 
educational if not exactly on point considering the issues for 
review. Notwithstanding this circumstance, Huber argues the 
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application of the reasonable suspicion test established in its 
currently followed form in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. at 881, 95 S.Ct. at 2579, 45 L.Ed.2d 607. This 
standard is now widely followed, including by Utah courts. The 
standard presents a usable framework for judicial analysis. 
Murray City does not object to its application in those cases 
where an officer's actions are based upon his or her reasonably 
drawn inferences from facts apparent and viewed in light of 
experience. While the suppression hearing considered facts 
supporting the initial stop, testimony also supports the 
determination that the officer's actions were reasonable under 
the circumstances. Officer Lindgren testified he was charged 
with enforcing any traffic code violations observed [T-71; in 
addition, he had specific duties to enforce motor vehicle 
violations involving alcohol [T-3]. He testified to his years 
of experience and, in passing, his specialized training. [T-3, 
7-8, 32-331. Having seen Huber run a red light, smelling a 
noticeable odor of alcohol, and being told by the driver that 
alcohol had been consumed, a reasonable officer will 
investigate the rational suspicion that its driver may have an 
alcohol concentration higher than that established by Utah 
lawmakers as presumptively indicative of driving while under 
the influence of intoxicating beverages. 
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designated by "AB".1 
of Section 77-35-12 (g) , Utah Code Ann., (as amended), is not 
helpful to the court's consideration of the issues before it. 
Murray City contends the denial of suppression was proper. 
That being the case, the City does not argue any sort of good 
faith exception to permit the trial court to admit evidence 
tainted by a supposed violation of Huber's rights under the 
Fourth Amendment. A Fourth Amendment violation of Huber's 
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure was not 
found. The evidence produced at the hearing concerned the 
validity of the stop. Had the case gone to trial as set by the 
trial judge, foundation would have been laid to admit the 
untainted evidence. 
An additional point of discussion related to the 
sub-topic of "totality of the circumstances" to which Murray 
City feels compelled to respond is that of "pretext" stops. In 
very clear language, the courts in Cole and Watson point 
out that a valid traffic violation stop is not a pretext stop. 
Appellant has taken the opportunity to present at great length 
[AB-16 through 21.1 an outline of factors which may or may not 
be probative in determining the "reasonableness" of the 
officer's stop of a particular vehicle. Suggesting that 
factors such as a nervous person making furtive gestures and of 
apparent Latin descent, that out-of-state plates on a vehicle 
travelling a particular route at a particular time of year and 
day assist in reviewing this case is not elucidating. This 
-25-
blanks- application * lompnf .< -r-n-* * = *-.-) 
d - . - • - x ^, . 5 
on appeal - also is another attempt -\ppei] J * * o 
broaden " ^ - «, cut appeax. mti w u i i oexow auceptea tne no 
contest p*t «- •' the charges alleged finding that the pleas 
wer* rf-'owi- -»* '"olunt-an v ^ n t p ^ d ur^* ^.dv. . * ^ nsel. 
T . :nse ..^ : foref 
stipul .1*" Even it this were not su „ -.  i"\ State v. 
Ea-: 4 j IP, , M 1 " I II , 1 ,'" I I II " II ,'" II I HI ,- { 
sobriety tests were admissible; :i nculpatory statemei its made 
during a l:)ii : i ef traffic stop ( fo] I owing the authority of 
317 [19841 ) ; i < irnissible; and further, Mi r a n d a warnings 
apply h custodial interrogation which never occurred in the 
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comp 1 icating fac tor. As cases previously cited point ::>i i I::,, 1:he 
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t .e i" Miranda. 
The suppression hearing below was held to determine the 
validity of the initial stop* The trial court found that 
Huber's violation of a traffic-control device justified the 
subsequent stop by Officer Lindgren. As the Cole and 
Watson courts found, officers authorized to stop a vehicle 
for a traffic violation are obviously authorized to approach 
the driver of the vehicle to prepare and issue the citation. 
It follows that evidence presented to the senses of an officer 
standing in a place he has a right to be may be investigated. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT TAKING UNCONTROVERTED 
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AT THE SUPPRESSION 
HEARING BELOW WAS IN THE BEST POSITION TO 
ASSESS THE WITNESS'S CREDIBILITY; BARRING A 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS DECISION, THAT RULING 
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. 
The suppression hearing was conducted before the trial 
judge alone. In 1987 the Utah Supreme Court held in State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (1987), that the clearly erroneous 
standard adopted as applicable to criminal bench trials carried 
the interpretation developed through federal practice. This 
same court adopted the standard's definition set forth in 
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 
68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). The Walker Court 
.quoting at 193 set out the definition as follows: 
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when 
although there is evidence to support it, 
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witness's credibility- t nt? decision ueiow shoul d be affirmed. 
;"• ':"':"'.. •' ' CONCLUSION 
This case, just as others , turns o:i: I ::i ts facts , W i I hoiit 
J
 to be] abor tt le fac ts, tt le transcri p t: ai i d i «", » i d 
cei-. • s court establish clearly tit :ie basis of 1 .1 le initial 
stop. A sworn officer, duty-bound must respond when, as here, 
the officer observed the driver enter the intersection and turn 
left after the left-turn light turned red. It was no mere 
hunch prompting Officer Lindgren to pursue the vehicle. From 
his lawful vantage point standing beside the vehicle, he 
reasonably inquired of the driver whether alcohol had been 
consumed inasmuch as the odor was prominent. Having seen a 
blatant traffic-device violation and having smelled alcohol 
emanating from the driver, could the officer reasonably ignore 
the facts in light of his duty to enforce the laws. Applying 
the reasonable suspicion test squarely to these facts, nothing 
in the record or transcript intimates unreasoned action on the 
part of Officer Lindgren. The trial judge heard and observed 
the witness's testimonial evidence. Upon finding the initial 
stop valid, subsequently collected evidence was untainted. The 
trial court's ruling to uphold the stop was entirely consistent 
with the uncontroverted factual testimony. This court should 
not disturb the ruling below. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of March, 1990. 
Jean P. Hendrickson 
Attorney for Respondent 
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